Rewarding evolutionary fitness with links between populations promotes
  cooperation by Wang, Zhen et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
4.
10
69
v1
  [
q-
bio
.PE
]  
3 A
pr
 20
14
Rewarding evolutionary fitness with links between populations promotes cooperation
Zhen Wanga, Attila Szolnokib, Matjazˇ Percc
aDepartment of Physics, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong & Center for Nonlinear Studies and Beijing-Hong Kong-Singapore Joint
Center for Nonlinear and Complex systems, Institute of Computational and Theoretical Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
bInstitute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Research Centre for Natural Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
cFaculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Korosˇka cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia
Abstract
Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma and the public goods game is studied, where initially players belong to two
independent structured populations. Simultaneously with the strategy evolution, players whose current utility exceeds a threshold
are rewarded by an external link to a player belonging to the other population. Yet as soon as the utility drops below the threshold, the
external link is terminated. The rewarding of current evolutionary fitness thus introduces a time-varying interdependence between
the two populations. We show that, regardless of the details of the evolutionary game and the interaction structure, the self-
organization of fitness and reward gives rise to distinguished players that act as strong catalysts of cooperative behavior. However,
there also exist critical utility thresholds beyond which distinguished players are no longer able to percolate. The interdependence
between the two populations then vanishes, and cooperators are forced to rely on traditional network reciprocity alone. We thus
demonstrate that a simple strategy-independent form of rewarding may significantly expand the scope of cooperation on structured
populations. The formation of links outside the immediate community seems particularly applicable in human societies, where an
individual is typically member in many different social networks.
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1. Introduction
Recent research has highlighted rewarding as
an effective means to promote public cooperation
(Rand et al., 2009; Szolnoki and Perc, 2010; Hauert,
2010; Mesterton-Gibbons et al., 2011). In comparison
to peer (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Semmann et al., 2003;
de Quervain et al., 2004; Fowler, 2005; Hauert et al.,
2007; Ga¨chter et al., 2008; Ohtsuki et al., 2009;
Rockenbach and Milinski, 2009; Deng et al., 2012;
Vukov et al., 2013) and pool punishment (Sigmund et al.,
2010; Szolnoki et al., 2011; Perc, 2012; Traulsen et al., 2012),
rewarding may lead to higher total earnings without potential
damage to reputation (Milinski et al., 2002) or fear of retalia-
tion (Dreber et al., 2008). The application of rewarding also
avoids the problem of antisocial punishment (Herrmann et al.,
2008), which has been shown to significantly challenge the ef-
fectiveness of sanctioning (Rand et al., 2010; Rand and Nowak,
2011). Although the majority of previous studies addressing
the “stick versus carrot” dilemma (Sigmund et al., 2001;
Hilbe and Sigmund, 2010) concluded that punishment is more
effective than rewarding in sustaining public cooperation
(Sigmund, 2007), evidence suggesting that rewards may be as
effective as sanctions is mounting. Recent human experiments
(Yamagishi et al., 2012; Egloff et al., 2013) also challenge
the strong reciprocity model (Fehr et al., 2002), and related
theoretical explorations (Szolnoki and Perc, 2013a) indicate
that the application of either reward or punishment, but not
both, is evolutionary most advantageous.
Another relatively recent development is the study of evolu-
tionary games on interdependent networks (Wang et al., 2012b;
Go´mez-Garden˜es et al., 2012b,a; Wang et al., 2012a, 2013b;
Jiang and Perc, 2013; Szolnoki and Perc, 2013b). The sub-
ject has gained on prominence after the discovery that even
seemingly irrelevant changes in one network can have catas-
trophic and very much unexpected consequences in another
network (Buldyrev et al., 2010). Since the evolution of co-
operation, especially in human societies (Apicella et al., 2012;
Rand and Nowak, 2013; Helbing, 2013), also proceeds on such
interdependent networks, it is therefore of interest to deter-
mine to what extent this interdependence influences the out-
come of evolutionary games. It has been shown, for exam-
ple, that biased utility functions suppress the feedback of in-
dividual success and lead to a spontaneous separation of time
scales on interdependent networks (Wang et al., 2012b). If
utilities are symmetric, cooperation is promoted by means of
interdependent network reciprocity that relies on the simul-
taneous formation of correlated cooperative clusters on both
networks (Wang et al., 2013a). In addition to these exam-
ples, non-trivial organization of cooperators across the in-
terdependent layers (Go´mez-Garden˜es et al., 2012b), strategy-
independent information sharing (Szolnoki and Perc, 2013b),
probabilistic interconnectedness (Wang et al., 2012a), as well
as optimal interdependence (Wang et al., 2013b), have all
been shown to extend the boundaries of traditional net-
work reciprocity (Nowak and May, 1992) past its limits on
isolated networks (Santos et al., 2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2006;
Preprint submitted to Journal of Theoretical Biology June 21, 2018
Szabo´ and Fa´th, 2007; Perc et al., 2013).
Here we wish to extend the scope of evolutionary games
on interdependent networks by introducing rewards for high-
enough evolutionary fitness of individual players in the form of
additional links that bridge the gap between two initially dis-
connected populations. We introduce a utility threshold E that,
if met or exceeded, allows the pertinent player to connect with
the corresponding player in the other network. These rewards
effectively introduce interdependence between the two popula-
tions, and they allow the rewarded players to increase their util-
ity with a fraction of the utility of the player in the other pop-
ulation. However, as soon as the fitness of a player no longer
reaches the threshold, its external link is terminated, although
it may eventually be re-awarded if and when the utility of the
player again becomes sufficiently large. Importantly, the on-
off nature of the interdependence between the corresponding
players in the two populations draws exclusively on the current
level of fitness, without regard of previous evolutionary success
or strategy. We consider the weak prisoner’s dilemma game
as representative for social dilemmas that are governed by pair-
wise interactions, and the public goods game which is represen-
tative for social dilemmas that are governed by group interac-
tions. We also consider different types of networks to describe
the interactions among players in each of the two structured
populations. As we will show, regardless of these details, the
self-organization of fitness and reward promotes the evolution
of cooperation well past the boundaries imposed by traditional
network reciprocity (Nowak and May, 1992), as well as past
the boundaries imposed by interdependent network reciprocity
(Wang et al., 2013a), if only the utility threshold is sufficiently
large. On the other hand, the threshold must not exceed a criti-
cal value, which could be well below the maximal possible util-
ity a cooperator is able to reach if it would be fully surrounded
by other cooperators. We will extend and explain these results
in detail in Section 3, while in the subsequent section we pro-
ceed with the description of the studied evolutionary games.
2. Evolutionary games
The evolutionary games are staged on two disjoint square
lattices or random regular graphs with periodic boundary con-
ditions, each of size N, where initially each player x is des-
ignated either as a cooperator (sx = C) or defector (sx = D)
with equal probability. The weak prisoner’s dilemma game is
characterized by the temptation to defect T = b, reward for mu-
tual cooperation R = 1, and both the punishment for mutual
defection P as well as the suckers payoff S equaling 0, where
1 < b ≤ 2 (Nowak and May, 1992). In this case a player re-
ceives its payoff by playing the game with all its neighbors. For
the public goods game, players are arranged into overlapping
groups of size G, where every player is thus surrounded by its
k = G − 1 neighbors and is a member in g = G different groups
(Santos et al., 2008; Perc et al., 2013). In each group, coopera-
tors contribute 1 to the public good, while defectors contribute
nothing. The sum of contributions is subsequently multiplied
by the factor r > 1, reflecting the synergetic effects of coopera-
tion, and the resulting amount is equally shared amongst the G
group members. Here the total payoff of a player is the sum of
payoffs from all the g groups where she is member.
We simulate the evolutionary process on both networks in
accordance with the standard Monte Carlo simulation proce-
dure comprising the following elementary steps. First, a player
x is selected randomly and its payoff Πx is determined based
on the governing evolutionary game (either the weak prisoner’s
dilemma game or the public goods game). Next, a neighbor
y from the same network is chosen randomly and acquires its
payoff Πy in the same way. Lastly, player y adopts the strategy
of player x with the probability
W(sx → sy) = 11 + exp[(Uy − Ux)/K] , (1)
where K = 0.1 quantifies the uncertainty related to the strategy
adoption process (Szabo´ and Fa´th, 2007), while Ux and Uy are
the utilities of players x and y, respectively. All those players
that have an external link to the corresponding player x′ in the
other network have the utility
Ux = Πx + αΠx′ , (2)
while those that do not have an external link retain Ux = Πx.
We emphasize at this point that the external links are directed.
Hence, only player x benefits from the additional link, but
not player x′. We also do not allow a direct interaction be-
tween the two mentioned players. Based on our preceding work
(Wang et al., 2013b), where we have studied the general impact
of the value of α and the related optimal interdependence be-
tween two networks, we here use a fixed value of α = 0.5 with-
out loosing generality. Monte Carlo simulations are performed
on sufficiently large networks ranging in size from N = 4·104 to
2.5 · 105 near transition points to avoid accidental extinction of
the two competing strategies. The stationary fraction of coop-
erators ρC is recorded after the system reaches dynamical equi-
librium, i.e., when the average cooperation level becomes time
independent. More specifically, we perform 104 Monte Carlo
steps (MCS) to reach the stationary state, and subsequently 106
more steps to record ρC . Moreover, we average the final out-
come over up to 100 independent initial conditions to further
improve accuracy.
To distinguish who is eligible for an external link, we intro-
duce a two-value tag for each player. If qx = 1 the utility of
the player x is determined according to Eq. 2, while if qx = 0
the utility remains equal to the payoff stemming from the inter-
actions on the host network. Initially all players have qx = 0.
Subsequently, if the utility of player x with its current tag value
is equal or above the threshold E, we set qx = 1. If not, the
tag remains zero. Evidently, if the value of E is minimal, which
is E = 0 for the weak prisoner’s dilemma game, then all play-
ers are rewarded with an external link and hence are able to
enhance their utility according to Eq. 2. If the value of E is
too high, on the other hand, no player is ever awarded with
an external link, and the two populations remain disconnected
(independent of one another). Intermediate values of E, how-
ever, promise interesting results as the evolutionary processes
on each individual network become interdependent through the
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Figure 1: Intermediate values of the utility threshold E are able to sustain
widespread cooperation in the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game, even at
temptations to defect where the evolution on an isolated graph would termi-
nate in an absorbing D phase (see legend). However, as soon as a critical value
E = Ec is reached, the two populations become independent, and the value of
ρC drops to the level that is characteristic for an isolated network. Since here the
interaction network for both populations is a square lattice where every player
is connected to its four nearest neighbors, the critical value is Ec = 4, which is
the maximal payoff of a cooperator (if all its neighbors are also cooperators).
We note, however, that this is accurate threshold is an exception, since in gen-
eral the value of Ec is somewhat lower than the maximal cooperator payoff, as
it also depends on the typical size of cooperative clusters [which in turn de-
pends on b (r in the public goods game)]. At E = 0, on the other hand, the
two populations are completely interdependent (every player has a link to the
corresponding player in the other network), and due to interdependent network
reciprocity (Wang et al., 2013a), the level of cooperation is still significantly
higher than on an isolated network (as obtained for E ≥ Ec).
time-varying addition and removal of the external links. We
note that the selection of an external player from the other pop-
ulation is done randomly and is not influenced by its actual tag.
If the linking would be tag-based, this might give rise to further
nontrivial effects due to the establishment of bilateral connec-
tions, as it discussed recently in a related work by Fu et al.
(Fu et al., 2012). While we wish to avoid this possibility within
the scope of present study, it may constitute a worthy research
challenge to be addressed in the future.
3. Results
For easier comparison, we first present results for the most
traditional setup, using as the interaction network for both pop-
ulations the square lattice and the weak prisoner’s dilemma as
the governing evolutionary game. Results presented in Fig. 1
illustrate the threshold-dependence of the cooperation level,
as recorded in both populations together. It can be observed
that there exist an intermediate value of the utility threshold E,
at which the evolution of cooperation is optimally promoted.
However, while the rise of ρC is steady as E increases, the drop
is sudden, and it occurs at a critical values of the threshold
(E = Ec = 4), which is related to the maximal payoff attain-
able by a cooperator. In the depicted case the critical value is
actually identical to the maximal cooperator payoff, but as we
will show in what follows, this is an exception rather than the
rule. The E = 0 threshold renders all players worthy of the re-
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Figure 2: Promotion of cooperation at intermediate values of the utility thresh-
old E is robust against the variation of the interaction network. The upper layer
depicts the fraction of cooperators ρC in dependence on E for different values
of b (see legend), as obtained on a regular random graph where every player
has degree k = 8. The bottom layer depicts the fraction of rewarded players fE
whose utility is above the threshold E. Note that there is a strong correlation
between the dependence of ρC and fE . Importantly, here the critical value of
E = Ec depends somewhat on b (because the values of b determines the typi-
cal size of cooperative clusters), and it is also below the maximally attainable
payoff of a cooperator (if all its neighbors would also be cooperators). This indi-
cates that the Ec value does not necessarily imply a strict prohibition of external
links. Cooperators that are located deep within large cooperative clusters may
still be eligible for the reward, but the cooperators at the edge are vulnerable,
which will eventually lead to the erosion of cooperative clusters and the disap-
pearance of external links even at Ec values that are smaller than the maximal
cooperator payoff. And since larger values of b give rise to smaller cooperative
clusters, the value of Ec decreases as the temptation to defect increases.
ward [an external link to the corresponding player in the other
network and with it related higher utility (see Eq. 2)], and thus
introduces full interdependence between the two populations.
The evolution of cooperation then proceeds with the support
of interdependent network reciprocity (Wang et al., 2013a). On
the other hand, if E ≥ Ec, players are in general unable to reach
the threshold, which leaves the two populations fully indepen-
dent. Traditional network reciprocity (Nowak and May, 1992)
is then the sole mechanism supporting the survival of cooper-
ators, and it can be observed that it is less effective than inter-
dependent network reciprocity (the E = 0 case). Just slightly
below the critical value, however, cooperators fare best, and in
what follows we will present results in favor of the robustness
of this observation, as well as results that explain it.
We first test the robustness by replacing the square lattice in-
teraction topology with the random regular graph where every
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Figure 3: Promotion of cooperation at intermediate values of the utility thresh-
old E is robust against the variation of game details. Here results for the public
goods game are presented, as obtained on a square lattice where every player
is involved in five groups of size G = 5. As in Fig. 2, the critical value of the
threshold E = Ec depends on the multiplication factor r (see legend), and it is
lower than the maximally attainable payoff of a cooperator in five groups where
all other players would also cooperate. As in the prisoner’s dilemma game, this
is related to the decreasing size of cooperative clusters as r decreases, and to the
vulnerability of cooperators that are positioned along the edges of cooperative
domains (see also Fig. 2).
player has eight neighbors. Results presented in Fig. 2(a) are
qualitatively identical to those presented in Fig. 1. The depen-
dence of ρC on E is somewhat smoother, and due to the larger
number of neighbors (on the square lattice players have only
four neighbors each), the critical threshold value Ec could be
approximately two times as large as on the square lattice. But
not quite. Indeed, it is lower than the maximally attainable co-
operator payoff (which in this case would be eight), and it also
decreases as the temptation to defect b increases. These subtle
features, which remain hidden in Fig. 1, provide vital insights
that help to understand why and how the evolution of coopera-
tion is promoted. In particular, the fact that the value of Ec is
lower than the maximal payoff of a cooperator indicates that the
critical threshold value does not necessarily involves the prohi-
bition of rewarding. Cooperators deep in the bulk of a coop-
erative domain may qualify at any given time, but those along
the interface are vulnerable because they are unable to reach
a sufficiently high fitness to be rewarded. Defectors are there-
fore able to invade, which eventually leads to the disintegration
of the clusters. In the stationary state even the aforementioned
“central” cooperators will fall victim to the high utility thresh-
old, and they will not be awarded an external link, and thus also
will not be able to resist the invasion of defectors. To support
this argument and to demonstrate the key role of the interde-
pendence between the two populations, we present in Fig. 2(b)
the fraction of players that have an external link (are rewarded)
in dependence on the threshold E. It can be observed that there
is a direct correlation between the fraction of rewarded players
and the fraction of cooperators in the population.
Going further in the exploration of robustness of our find-
ings, we return to the square lattice as the interaction network,
but we replace the pairwise driven prisoner’s dilemma game
with the group-driven public goods game (Santos et al., 2008;
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Figure 4: The evolution of cooperation among players with an external link
explains the promotion of cooperation at the microscopic level. Depicted is the
fraction of cooperators amongst all the players that fulfil Ux ≥ E, denoted as
ρCE , and the overall fraction of cooperators in both populations, in dependence
on the threshold E. Only if the distinguished players are rare (which occurs at
sufficiently high values of E), but at the same time are also still able to percolate
(which requires E < Ec), will cooperative behavior be optimally promoted.
Left panel shows the results obtained with the prisoner’s dilemma game on
a regular random graph where every player has degree k = 8, and using the
temptation to defect b = 1.1. Right panel depicts the results of the public
goods game on a square lattice using r/G = 0.76. We note that to plot ρCE
for E ≥ Ec is meaningless, because no such players exist, as evidenced by the
results presented in Fig. 2(b) for the prisoner’s dilemma game.
Perc et al., 2013). As Fig. 3 illustrates, in this case too the evo-
lution of public cooperation is promoted, and essentially the
same conclusions apply as outlined above for the results pre-
sented in Fig. 2. In agreement with the behavior we have ob-
served for the prisoner’s dilemma game, the harsher the social
dilemma (in this case the smaller the multiplication factor r),
the smaller the critical threshold value E = Ec at which the two
populations become fully independent and the cooperation level
drops. Just like larger values of b in the prisoner’s dilemma
game decrease the typical size of compact cooperative clusters,
so do decreasing values of r in the public goods game do the
same. Both the increase of the temptation to defect and the de-
crease of the multiplication factor enhance the severity of the
social dilemma. And because the cooperative clusters become
smaller in size, their ability to contain cooperators that might be
able reach close-to-optimal payoffs decreases, and so does the
value of Ec.
To explain the observed behavior at the microscopic level, we
measure the cooperation level specifically amongst those play-
ers who possess an external link because their utility is above
the threshold value E. In Fig. 4, we plot this quantity (denoted
by ρCE ), and we also show the cooperation level in both pop-
ulations for comparison. If the value of E is small, then there
is no significant difference between ρCE and ρE . If we increase
the threshold, then two mechanisms will emerge that support
each other’s impact. On the one hand, by increasing the value
of E, heterogeneity is introduced to both populations because
not all players will fulfill the condition to be rewarded with an
external link. Such heterogeneity will enhance the impact of
network reciprocity because of the long-term advantage of co-
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Figure 5: Inserting a small cooperative domain, consisting of 780 players, into
a homogeneous populations of 4 · 104 defectors reveals the spreading of distin-
guished (rewarded) players, which is due to the self-organization of fitness and
reward. Depicted is the time evolution of the fraction of rewarded players fE
that satisfy Ux ≥ E (left) and the overall cooperator density ρC (right) versus
the number of Monte Carlo steps for b = 1.1, E = 5.9 (solid blue line) and
E = 6.0 (dashed red line), as obtained on a regular random graph where every
player has degree k = 8. If the threshold is higher than the critical value Ec
(E = 6.0 in this case), a negligible minority of players is rewarded, but they are
unable to percolate. Accordingly, cooperators are forced to rely solely on tradi-
tional network reciprocity, and their density is accordingly low. Just a tiny drop
in E below Ec (E = 5.9 in this case) enables rewarded players to percolate and
thus to support each other, and therefore the stationary fraction of cooperators
rises significantly.
operative leaders (the latter was identified earliest with the dis-
covery that scale-free networks provide a unifying framework
for the evolution of cooperation (Santos and Pacheco, 2005)).
The distinguished cooperators will be followed by those who
fail to reach the rewarding threshold, which will in turn increase
ρC . On the other hand, the relatively rare rewarded players need
to percolate, i.e., they still have to be sufficiently common for
their influence in the population to overlap. If their influence
does not overlap, in the absence of percolation, the advantage
of cooperative behavior cannot manifest, which will reduce the
cooperation level. Noteworthy, this behavior is related to the
optimal density of players on a network, which we have re-
cently explored in isolated structured populations (Wang et al.,
2012d,c).
Finally, to provide direct evidence that the self-organized
spreading of rewarded players will elevate cooperation, we de-
vise a specific experiment, wherein, starting from a full D state,
we insert a small cooperator domain into both graphs which
are not correlated to each other. To illustrate the robustness of
the leading mechanism we use random regular graphs, where
the cooperative domain is constructed by starting from a single
cooperative player and subsequently denoting all its neighbors
and the neighbors of neighbors, and so forth, as cooperators,
until the initial fraction of cooperators in the whole population
reaches 2%. By using two different threshold values, we mon-
itor how the fraction of rewarded players, and how the general
cooperation level, evolve. To emphasize the delicate role of the
threshold, we have chosen two E values that are slightly be-
low and above the critical utility Ec for the applied b value. As
Fig. 5 illustrates, players cannot become distinguished if the de-
mand for the reward is too high, and consequently the cooper-
ation can reach a level which is attainable solely by traditional
network reciprocity. If we lower the threshold only slightly,
then more players become eligible for the reward and can build
an external link to the corresponding player in the other net-
work, and the latter will in turn support the higher utility in
future trails. If we compare the applied values of E in Fig. 5,
it becomes clear than just a tiny change can yield a significant
difference in fE (the fraction of players that are rewarded). Be-
cause the rare, yet still sufficiently common, rewarded players
percolate, they can support each other through the overlap of
extensive cooperative clusters that surround them, which in turn
significantly elevates the cooperation level in the whole system.
4. Discussion
The evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals
is a long-standing problem which attracts research from a
wide range fields, including biology and the social sciences
(Mesterton-Gibbons and Dugatkin, 1992; Mesterton-Gibbons,
2001; Nowak, 2006; Sigmund, 2010). We have studied the
evolution of cooperation in two initially independent structured
populations, where players were rewarded with an external link
to a player in the other network if their current utility reached
or exceeded a given threshold. Being rewarded with an exter-
nal link implied the acquisition of part of the corresponding
player’s payoff, and thus increasing one’s own evolutionary po-
tential in the next round of the game. Importantly, we have con-
sidered rewards being representative only for the current evolu-
tionary success. Thus, as soon as the utility of a player dropped
below the utility threshold, the external link was removed.
It was shown that this simple but intuitive coevolutionary
rule introduces a time-varying interdependence between the
two populations, which provides a dynamical coupling between
them. As a result of coevolution between strategy dependent fit-
ness and external links a threshold-dependent interdependency
will emerge and stabilize. We have also shown that it may sig-
nificantly promote the evolution of cooperation if the applied
utility threshold is neither too small nor to large. If it is too
small, the two populations are fully interdependent, and the
benefits for the evolution of cooperation are similar to those
warranted by interdependent network reciprocity (Wang et al.,
2013a). If, on the other hand, the utility threshold is too
high, the two populations are fully independent, and coopera-
tors may take advantage only of traditional network reciprocity
(Nowak and May, 1992). For intermediate values of the util-
ity threshold, and especially for values close but lower than a
critical threshold, cooperators can take advantage of percolat-
ing distinguished players that act as strong catalysts of cooper-
ative behavior by offering a cooperation supporting mechanism
to evolve at a higher level. Fine-tuning the utility threshold has
the important role of adjusting the density of rewarded players
just right. If the rewarded players are too many, the heterogene-
ity in the population vanishes, and so does the additional sup-
port for the evolution of cooperation. If the rewarded players
are too few, they are unable to percolate. Indeed, the rewarded
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players must be rare, but at the same time frequent enough to
percolate for the optimal conditions to emerge. The percola-
tion is related to the optimal density of players on a network,
which has recently been explored in detail on isolated popula-
tions for pairwise social dilemmas and the public goods game
(Wang et al., 2012d).
We have also established that the value of the critical thresh-
old is related to the maximal payoff that is attainable by a coop-
erator, although only in special cases will it be exactly equal to
this value (see Fig. 1). In general, the critical utility threshold
is lower that the maximal cooperator payoff because coopera-
tors that are located at the interfaces of cooperative domains
can never reach the highest payoffs. At such high threshold val-
ues (equal to the maximal cooperator payoff), the interfaces are
therefore vulnerable to the invasion by defectors, which eventu-
ally leads to the dissolution of cooperative clusters. The value
of the critical utility threshold also decreases with the increas-
ing severity of the social dilemma (increasing value of b in the
prisoner’s dilemma game, or the decreasing value of the mul-
tiplication factor r in the public goods game), which is due to
the fact that at harsher conditions the cooperative clusters be-
come smaller. Their potential to harbor cooperators that might
reach a close-to-optimal payoff thus decrease as well, and ac-
cordingly so does the critical utility threshold that still warrants
percolation of those that are rewarded with an external link.
All the presented results are independent of the structure of
the applied interaction networks and the studied social dilemma
games, and thus appear to have a high degree of univer-
sality. We hope that the demonstration of the spontaneous
emergence of optimal interdependence by means of a simple
coevolutionary rule based on the self-organization of reward
and fitness will attract further research on the evolution of
cooperation on interdependent networks (Wang et al., 2012b;
Go´mez-Garden˜es et al., 2012b,a; Wang et al., 2012a, 2013a,b;
Jiang and Perc, 2013; Szolnoki and Perc, 2013b). The consid-
eration of interdependence appears to be particularly relevant
for human societies (Apicella et al., 2012; Rand and Nowak,
2013; Helbing, 2013), where individuals are typically members
in many different networks, and those networks might play dif-
ferent roles in the evolutionary process. Multilayer networks
are already in the focus of attention as the most apt description
of a networked society (Kivela¨ et al., 2013), and we hope that
our study will help contribute to the continued vibrancy of this
research avenue.
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